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IN THE UTAH SUPREMK ( ()l KT

JANET PETERSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 20000385SC

vs.
THE SUNRJDER CORPORATION,
dba SUNRJDER INTERNATIONAL,
and TEIFU CHEN,
Dcleml, m i l /

IT I Ices.

\|i|ii

. *:!**!' furi^H'* *»on
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction -nei \m> matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
-L-l.j).

Statement of Issues
Only Issues I iihu i'v .M the Plaintiff 's issues are be lore I IK .nil

i, lieinn.iftn ihmui,

Issues II .Hid III \\nv never presented to the trial court and thus not preserved for appellate
review. Issues I and IV ask this court to review the propriety of the trial court's grant of
l/eleiidanf s iiin HIH mi lun siinmiiii \ '[nth'tiit/ii! .mil (lie ni.il

inn's timiini nt' I Vfendant's motion for

summary judgment.

Sldiidai'd i»l Appellate Review
Issues I and IV present issues of law for the conn u Inch JIC reviewed for correctness.
Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const., Inc., 98 ^

... -

•. :„
1-

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes
U.S. Constitution Article I, § 10(1):
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin
a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.
Utah Constitution Article I, § 18:
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts shall
be passed.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-2(4):
Pyramid scheme means any sales device or plan under which a person gives consideration
to another person in exchange for compensation or the right to receive compensation
which is derived primarily from the introduction of other person into the sales device or
plan rather than from the sale of goods, services, or other property.

Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case
This case is an appeal from an order of the Fourth Judicial District dated March 31, 2000
granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment. The claims
dismissed included breach of contract and punitive damage claims against Defendant Sunrider
Corporation, and contract, tortious interference with contract, and punitive damage claims
against Defendant Tei Fu Chen, a principal of Defendant Sunrider Corporation. Plaintiff appeals
only the grant of summary judgment to Defendant on her contract claim. She does not challenge
the dismissal of her tort and punitive damage claims.
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Plaintiff Janet Peterson filed this matter in March 1996 attempting to assert breach of
contract and punitive damage claims against the Defendants. The Defendants answered and filed
a Motion to Dismiss the punitive damage claims because Plaintiff had failed to plead an
independent tort. At the hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff was granted leave
to file an amended complaint.
Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint wherein she alleged breach of contract
and punitive damage claims against both Defendant Sunrider Corporation and its principal
Defendant Tei Fu Chen. Plaintiff also asserted an "interference with contract claim" against
Defendant Tei Fu Chen. As punitive damages, Plaintiff requested the greater of $1,000,000, or
5% of Sunrider's annual gross sales from both Defendants. Lengthy discovery ensued which
included the necessity of Defendants filing repeated Motions to Compel Discovery.
In January 1998, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on her breach of
contract claim. Following receipt of Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, she filed another
Motion to Amend her complaint. She also sought leave of the court to name an expert witness
even though the time for doing so had long since passed.
In April 1998, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Summary
Judgment. In a Memorandum Decision dated June 15, 1998, the Honorable Howard H. Maetani
denied Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment but granted her Motion to Amend
complaint and for leave to name an expert witness. Judge Maetani also granted Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss and For Summary Judgment on all of Plaintiffs claims. Judge Maetani
reduced his decision to an order which was entered on October 6, 1998.
-3-

On October 14, 1998, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal. The Utah Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal as being from a non final order and a remittur was issued on January 21,
1999. More than one year later when nothing had been done on the case, Defendants filed
various motions including a Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute. Defendants' motion was
denied, and eventually, on March 31, 2000, a final order dismissing Plaintiffs claims was
entered. This appeal followed.

Statement of Facts
1.

Defendant Sunrider is a Utah Corporation which was incorporated on May 27, 1976
under the name "Naturalife International, Inc." R.l 189.

2.

Sunrider has always marketed various herbs, dietary supplements, skin care products and
beauty aids through a multi-level marketing plan. See 1994 Business Guide, R. 730-777

3.

In 1976, Plaintiffs husband made a proposal to Ken Murdock, the then president of the
Company to purchase a certain distributorship, the John and Sharon Farnsworth
organization. This proposal was put forward in writing, drafted by Lloyd Peterson. Ken
Murdock accepted the proposal. See R.1295.
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4.

The 1976 writing purports to waive the "personal purchase volume (PV)"1 for purposes of
Plaintiff remaining a Director and receiving "overrides." However, the writing waives
nothing else. R. 1295. A copy of the 1976 writing is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

5.

The 1976 writing was not intended to waive any of the requirements for Plaintiff to
remain or continue as a distributor, as opposed to a director. See, R., 1295; Deposition of
Ken Murdock R. 1019, p.21-22.

6.

The 1976 writing does not define any of the terms it uses, the term "overrides" (presently
called Leadership Development Bonus)2 is undefined. Neither does the writing detail
how any payments to Plaintiff are to be calculated, when and how they are to be paid, nor
at what percentage or on how many levels. R. 1295.

7.

Plaintiff conceded that the 1976 writing does not contain all the terms of the agreement.
Deposition of Janet Peterson R. 1270.

1. PV, which stands for purchase volume, and SV (sales volume) are one and the same; see
Deposition of Janet Peterson R. 372; these terms generally reflect the value of products sold. Id.;
Deposition of Kenny Jordan R. 341-342. Personal purchase or sales volume is the amount an
individual is required to purchase each month. Personal group SV is the combined value of
one's down line, excluding that of qualified associate directors and above. 1994 Business Guide
Intro-6, R. 775 (back of two sided page).
2. "Leadership Development Bonus is a fund available to Qualified Associate Directors and
above who have one or more Qualified Associate Directors or Directors in their organization. It
is calculated on 14% of total company SV. The bonus amount, which is based on a point system
and paid each month, may vary according to the [the qualifying director's] organization and total
company SV." 1994 Business Guide at Intro, R. 774-775. (Emphasis added).
-5-

8.

The 1976 writing was always dependant upon Business Guides.3 These guides spell out
percentages and other terms of the agreement, all of which are subject to periodic change.
Deposition of Janet Peterson, R. 1268-1270. Plaintiff testified that these changes occur in
response to "whatever happens. And the schedules do change . . . like Sunrider changed
their schedule every now and then to be a little different. NaturaLife had changed
theirs.... The [rates] could change... when [Sunrider] want[s] - if they feel that things
aren't quite right, you know, like the company put from $2,000 up to $3,000 for their
bonus volume." Id. In fact, Mrs. Peterson testified that to determine overrides due her,
"we would have to look at the Sunrider Business Guide." R. 1268:2-10. Without
reference to a Business Guide, it is impossible to determine or calculate Plaintiffs
Leadership Development Bonuses. Deposition of Kenny Jordan R.1210. The necessary
formulas do not appear in the 1976 writing. Id.

9.

Plaintiff has acknowledged and agreed that the terms necessary for determining her
Leadership Development Bonuses did and could be changed whenever Sunrider felt "like
things just weren't quite right." Deposition of Janet Peterson R. 1268-1270.

10.

Defendant Tei Fu Chen acquired all of the stock of NaturaLife International, Inc. in a
stock purchase agreement between himself and Ken Murdock dated September 24, 1982.
R. 1293.

3. The Business Guides have been known by various titles including Policy Guide (1978),
New Marketing Plan (1980), The NaturaLife Marketing Plan (1981), The Sunrider Opportunity
(1982), or the Business Guide and Distributor Agreement (1985-present). In 1983 and 1984, the
then latest version of the marketing plan were set forth in Sunrider's periodical called the
"Sunwriter." (See 1983 and 1984 Business Guide). For clarity and convenience, the term
"Business Guide" will be used when referring to the above documents. See R. 687, 676, 673,
661, 656, 647, 630, 607, 561, 984, 905, 866, 829, and 777.
-6-

11.

Following the stock purchase, Tei Fu Chen changed NaturaLife International, Inc.'s name
to The Sunrider Corporation. Deposition of Paul McCabe R. 1178-1179.

12.

Prior to the present action, Defendant Tei Fu Chen had never seen the 1976 writing. It
did not exist in any Sunrider files. Deposition of Tei Fu Chen R. 1221, 1227-1228.

13.

At the time Defendant Tei Fu Chen purchased the company's stock from Ken Murdock,
the 1976 writing was not discussed. Deposition of Tei Fu Chen 1224-1225. Indeed, Ken
Murdock has no recollection of ever discussing it with Defendant Tei Fu Chen and has no
idea whether Sunrider's President Oi-Lin Chen was aware of it. Deposition of Ken
Murdock R. 1187-1188.

14.

The 1976 writing is not mentioned or disclosed in the stock purchase agreement between
Defendant Tei Fu Chen and Ken Murdock. See R. 1279-1293.

15.

Defendant Tei Fu Chen was not a party to the 1976 writing, nor has he ever personally
assumed any obligations created by it. R. 1295; Deposition of Janet Peterson R. 12481252.

16.

Oi-Lin Chen is and was President of Sunrider at the time of the cessation of Plaintiffs
payments and was unaware of the existence of the 1976 writing at the time she made the
decision to stop payments to Plaintiff. Deposition of Oi-Lin Chen R. 1235-1236.

17.

Defendant Sunrider has well over fifty-thousand distributors in the United States and over
a million worldwide. Deposition of Oi-Lin Chen R. 1230.

18.

Sunrider uses a computer system which reviews qualifications and issues checks to
individuals based upon the Business Guides. Deposition of Oi-Lin Chen, R. 1237-1238;
Deposition of Ras Jeyakumar R. 1200, 1204.
-7-

19.

Since at least 1989, the computer system had been "hot coded" as it related to Plaintiff so
that checks were issued even through she was not qualified. Deposition of Yung Chin
Chiang R. 1191-1197.

20.

A random audit conducted by Sunrider's accounting department discovered that Plaintiff
was receiving payments even though she was not qualified. Deposition of Ras Jeyakumar
R. 1201-1203.

21.

Plaintiffs husband, Lloyd Peterson, passed away in April, 1986. Deposition of Janet
Peterson (revised) R. 1274.

22.

Following the death of Mr. Peterson, Tei Fu Chen recalls being informed that Janet
Peterson was having a difficult time qualifying for payments. During the same time
period, the company moved from Provo, Utah to Torrance, California. Deposition of Tei
FuChenR. 1226, 1223, 1222-1223.

23.

Defendant Tei Fu Chen agreed to allow a grace period for Janet Peterson to qualify.
Sunrider continued to pay Plaintiff because they "forgot" about the Janet Peterson
situation. Id.

24.

As president of the company, Oi-Lin Chen elected to stop payments to Plaintiff. This
decision was not discussed with her husband, Tei Fu Chen. Tei Fu Chen was unaware of
the decision until after this litigation was initiated. Deposition of Oi-Lin Chen R.
1233,1239-1240; Deposition of Tei Fu Chen R. 1226.

25.

As president, Oi-Lin Chen stopped payments to Plaintiff because Plaintiff was not
complying with Sunrider's qualification requirements and was neither working nor
training her down line. Mrs. Chen wanted to ensure that all bonuses paid to distributors
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complied with the laws regulating Multi Level Marketing. Mrs. Chen further concluded
that it was unfair to other distributors who were actively working to pay Plaintiff for
doing nothing. Finally it was Mrs. Chen's desire to preserve the integrity of the
multilevel plan. Deposition of Oi-Lin Chen pp. 1231-1233.
26.

In December 1994, Mrs. Chen, as president, sent Plaintiff a letter on Sunrider letterhead,
informing her that her payments would be terminated. Mrs. Chen also invited Plaintiff to
requalify and assured her that if she would requalify, Plaintiffs account would be
reevaluated. R. 1277.

27.

Defendant Sunrider markets its products through a multi-level marketing sales program.
Presently, Sunrider distributors are primarily compensated in three different ways:
a.

They buy products at wholesale and sell at retail.

b.

They receive a group development bonus (also presently called an "override"
which is different from the "overrides" referred to in the 1976 writing) on the
"group" sales of personally sponsored distributors of lesser rank, limited to
unqualified associate directors and below.

c.

Once they qualify and maintain the level of a qualified Associate Director or
above, they receive a "Leadership Development Bonus" on the group sales of
Qualified Associated Directors and above occurring in their organization.

See 1994 Business Guide at 2-5 to 2-18, R. 752-759.
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27.

A set percentage of the total sales volume4 of the company, 38.5%, is set aside to pay
distributor compensation, including the Leadership Development Bonuses. Fourteen
percent (which is included in the 38.5%) of company sales volume is apportioned to the
Leadership Development Bonus Fund. Sunrider is required under the marketing plan set
forth in the Business Guides to pay these percentages. Neither Sunrider nor its
shareholders save money or otherwise benefit from paying one distributor versus another
because Sunrider pays these set percentages irrespective of who the particular qualifying
recipients of the funds are. Neither Sunrider, Tei Fu Chen nor Oi-Lin Chen have, will, or
can benefit by the cessation of payments to Janet Peterson. 1994 Business Guide 2-10, 222, R. 750, 756. Affidavit of Ras Jeyakumar, R. 1361-1362; Deposition of Janet Peterson
R. 1245-1246.

28.

Plaintiff understands Sunrider does not save money by not paying her, as Sunrider is
required to pay the Leadership Development Bonuses to other qualified persons and
Sunrider pays out 38.5% of all company SV as compensation to its Distributors. Id.

29.

Changes to the Sunrider Business Guide have occurred at least twenty times since 1976.
See R. 437-984. The formulas used to calculate the Leadership Development Bonuses
have undergone significant modifications over the years, both to Plaintiffs benefit and
detriment. For example, in 1978 through 1980, overrides (presently referred to as
Leadership Development Bonuses) were paid three levels deep, at 10% for the first level,

4. "Sales volume" or SV is a concept used throughout the Business Guides. It is generally
the retail value of a particular product, though some products have a point value for the purpose
of calculating sales volume less than the retail value. Accordingly, company sales volume is a
rough approximation of the Company's gross sales. See note 1, infra.
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3% for the second level and 1% for the third level. See R. 675, 682. No mention of
overrides appears in the 1981 Marketing Plan. R. 663-673. In 1982, Leadership
Development Bonuses were only paid one level deep at 8%. R. 660. In 1983 and 1984,
the Leadership Development Bonuses were again paid 3 levels deep, but at lower rates:
6% for the first level, 3% for the second level, and 1% for the third level. R. 641, 654.
From 1985 to the present, Leadership Development Bonuses have been paid three levels
deep but at an even lower rate: 6% for the first level, 2% for the second level, and 1% at
the third level. R.469,512,554,600,623-624,707-708, 756,816-817, 857, 903, 898, 977,
940-941, (See 1985-present Business Guides).
Presently, Plaintiff has one first-level qualified director in her organization (Sharon
Farnsworth). Under the 1994 Business Guide's Leadership Bonus schedule, Plaintiff, if
she otherwise qualified, would be paid three levels deep at 6%, 2% and 1% respectively.
R. 756 (1994 Business Guide 2-13).
By changing the Leadership Development Bonuses calculation from payment based upon
one level (as was the case in 1982) to payments based upon three levels at the 1994
scheduled rate results in an increase of nearly four-hundred percent of the amount of
Plaintiffs leadership development bonus. For example, using the November 1994 sales
numbers and applying the 1982 Business Guide formula results in a payment of $786.53.
Payment based upon three levels, at 6%-2%-l% (the calculation in place for 1985 to
present), resulted in the amount of $3,199.47, which was actually paid to and accepted by
Plaintiff. Deposition of Kenny Jordan R. 1211-1216.
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As changes have occurred in the payment formulae, changes to the qualifications for
Plaintiff to maintain her Director status have also changed, also to Plaintiffs benefit and
detriment. For example, the monthly PV (presently called S V) requirements have varied
as follows:
a.

In 1978, to remain a director, one was required to maintain a monthly PV of 1000,
though alternate months could fall as low as 500. See R. 684;

b.

In 1980 and 1981, PV of 1000 in any given month plus an average of 850 across 4
most recent months was required. R. 664, 675-676;

c.

In 1982, the directorship requirement shifted again: a cumulative PV of 4000 with
1000 in the qualifying month was required. R. 660;

d.

In 1983, this was changed to a group cumulative PV of 4000, with 1000 in the
qualifying month. R. 656;

e.

In 1984, personal SV of 100, personal group of 1000 were required. R. 638-640.

f.

In 1985, a cumulative group SV of 8000, with 2000 group SV in qualifying
month, and 1000 group SV per month was required. R. 624;

g.

In 1986, a personal SV of 100, 8000 cumulative group SV, plus 2000 group SV
was necessary. R. 600-605;

h.

In 1987, a cumulative PV of 8000 with 2000 in the qualifying month and personal
SV of 100 was required to maintain director status. R. 554-559;

i.

In 1989, personal SV of 100, cumulative group SV of 8000 SV, plus 2000 SV in
qualifying month was required. R. 977-980;
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j.

In 1990, continuing through 1993, the requirements were increased to 100
personal purchase volume, cumulative personal group SV of 12,000, plus
maintaining 3000 SV each month. R. 899-900, 860-861, 817,819-820;

k.

In 1994, this was modified so that directors had to reach 100 personal SV per
month, 3000 personal group per month. R. 756-757.

33.

Presently there are seventeen different levels of achievement under which Sunrider
distributors may earn various forms of compensation. R. 155-151.5

34.

Year after year, Plaintiff received the Sunrider Business Guides and reviewed them in
detail to see what changes the company had made. She reviewed them when she received
them, a practice that never ceased. Deposition of Janet Peterson R. 1257-1258. She
received the last business guide in 1994. Sunrider sent them to her. Id.; R. 1399
(Response No. 3 to Request for Admission dated 2-28-97).

35.

Neither the Plaintiff nor her husband ever complained of any change to the Sunrider
Business Guides. Deposition of Tei Fu Chen, See Addendum.

36.

Plaintiffs distributorship (called "Company Direct") has been inactive for a period of
more than one year. R. 327, 396, 1259, 1363-1365.

5. In 1978, there were 5 levels: Distributor, Assistant Director, Director, Group Director and
Senior Director. R. 683-685.
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37.

The 1994 Business Guide provides that "A Sunrider Distributor whose account is inactive
for a period of one (1) year will be automatically terminated by Sunrider.6 R. 733 (back
side of double sided page).

38.

"Company Direct" has maintained neither 100 personal SV nor personal group SV of
3000, each of which is a requirement to be a "Qualified Director." R. 1256, Deposition
of Janet Peterson; R. 223, Affidavit of Janet Peterson; R. 321, Plaintiffs Response to
Request for Admission No. 7; R. 820, 757-757.

39.

The 1994 Sunrider Business Guide provides:
E.

Sales Leaders

A "Sales Leader" is a Sunrider Distributor who has

achieved the rank of Director or above. In order to remain a "Sales
Leader," and thus continue to qualify for those commissions, bonuses and
incentives associated with the rank, a Distributor must assume the
responsibilities and perform the functions of a "Sales Leader." R. 735
(back side of two sided page).

6. Inactivity is defined as "the absence of any wholesale purchases from Sunrider during the
entire 12 month period." R. 733, 1994 Business Guide at 3-17.
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40.

Plaintiff concedes she has not met the qualification of a "Sales Leader."7 R.223, Affidavit
of Janet Peterson; R. 320-321, Response to Request for Admission Nos. 8-10.

41.

Plaintiff testified that it would not have been difficult for her to comply with requirements
associated with meeting the definition of a sales leader. R. 1243-1244, Deposition of
Janet Peterson.

42.

Sunrider has made some of its changes to the Business Guide in response to evolving
federal and state law, statutory, common, and regulatory, regarding multi-level marketing,
and in particular, laws requiring a link between compensation to distributors and the
actual sale of product. R. 1181-1182, Deposition of Robert Katchen; R. 1363-1365,
Affidavit of Robert Katchen).

43.

The 1993 and 1994 Business Guides required all distributors to make and document at
least 5 retail sales a month. R. 758,764 (back side of two sided page),793 and 820.

7. Included among the responsibilities and functions of a "Sales Leader" are duties to:
1.
conduct periodic sales meetings, as dictated by the size and demands of the
organization, for the purpose of training and motivating the Distributors in
a Distributors organization. Where the personal group and sales
organization is spread over a wide area, the Sales Leader will either
personally travel to various central areas to hold meetings on a periodic
basis, or will arrange for someone else, either his sponsor or up line sales
leaders, to provide such motivational and training meetings. Physically
isolated Distributors should be trained by frequent mail and telephone
contact.
2.
Maintain frequent mail contact with all distributors in his or her personal
group, including the publishing of sales, motivational and training meeting
dates and locations, additional sales news, if any, or any other relevant
information.
3.
Give advice on any promotional activities carried on by Distributors in the
sales organization to assure they conform with this agreement or any other
Sunrider produced promotional materials.
R. 734-735.
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44.

The Company Direct account has not made and documented 5 retail sales a month. R.
1261, Deposition of Janet Peterson; R. 1363-1365, Affidavit of Robert Katchen.

45.

From 1986 to 1992, the business guides contained the following language:
Cancellation, Termination . •. Any distributorship may be canceled by Sunrider
for any violation of the Business Guide . . . Distributor Application and
Agreement... Violations of the Sunrider Code of Ethics, Distributor Agreement,
or the written policies of the company may be cause for termination.
Exclusive Rules This Business Guide, Sunrider Distributor Application and
Agreement, and the instruments and documents referred to herein constitute the
entire understanding of the parties with respect to this subject matter. The
Business Guide and Distributor Agreement may be amended only by an
instrument in writing signed by an authorized officer of Sunrider. Should any
inconsistencies arise, the terms and conditions of this Business Guide and
Distributor Agreement shall be controlling.
Waiver No failure of Sunrider to exercise any power given to it under this
Business Guide, Distributor Application and Agreement or to insist upon strict
compliance by a distributor with any obligation or provision hereunder and no
customer or practice of the parties at variance with the terms hereunder shall
constitute a waiver of Sunrider's right to demand exact compliance with this
Business Guide and Distributor Agreement. Waiver by Sunrider can only be
effected in writing by an authorized officer of Sunrider.
R. 591-592, 500-501, 966 (including back side of double sided page, 883-884 (including
back side of double sided pages), 842-843 (including back side of double sided pages).

46.

Similar provisions have been in place since 1993. R. 689-690, 730-733, 779,781-782.
Summary of Argument
The trial court correctly determined that Plaintiffs interpretation of her contract is for an

illegal purpose given her refusal to make any efforts to conduct retail sales or to train and
develop her down-line. Because Plaintiff admitted that she was not conducting retail sales or
acting as a sales leader by training and promoting her down-line, the Defendants were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs breach of contract claim.
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Plaintiff did not preserve for appeal her claims regarding the Utah and United States
Constitutional prohibitions on the impairment of contracts. Similarly, she failed to preserve for
appeal her arguments about an improper retroactive application of Utah's Anti-Pyramid Act.
This court can also affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs claims because under traditional
contract construction analysis, Plaintiff was in breach of her contract because the 1976 agreement
only waived the personal purchase volume requirements for receiving overrides. By its express
terms, the 1976 writing said nothing about waiving personal group purchase volume
requirements, meeting minimal requirements for maintaining a distributorship, conducting retail
sales, or meeting the definition of a sales leader.
In addition, because Plaintiff testified that Sunrider could and had modified the Business
Guides periodically, and while aware of the new requirements she had accepted monthly
payments, as a matter of law, Plaintiff assented to changes set forth in the Business Guides.
Because she admitted she was not meeting the new requirements, Defendants were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
The trial court did not err in denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendants presented sufficient evidence suggesting the 1976 agreement had been modified
including Plaintiffs testimony that Defendants could modify the Business Guides whenever
things weren't quite right. Plaintiffs arguments regarding the statue of frauds are not well placed
because the statue of frauds is applied literally. In any event, because 1976 writing did not
contain all of the required terms, any modification would not have to meet the statute of frauds
either. Plaintiff could not prove her damages without either admitting that the Business Guides
did modify the 1976 agreement, or without the benefit of expert testimony. At the time she filed
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her Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff did not have an expert witness and the time for
naming one had long since passed. It was only after this omission was pointed out in Defendants
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment that Plaintiff sought leave to name an expert
witness. Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded Plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.
Argument
I. Standard For Reviewing Summary Judgment
Summary Judgment is proper when there are no disputes as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Once the movant has
set forth facts as to which the movant asserts no genuine issue exists, and which demonstrate a
failure of proof, lack of legal merit, or otherwise show an entitlement to judgment, the nonmoving party "must come forward with sufficient proof to support his or her claim, particularly
when that party has had an opportunity to conduct discovery." Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944
P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997) citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
In order to come forward with sufficient facts, the non-moving party must specifically
controvert the movant's statement of facts, or those facts are deemed admitted. Utah R. Jud.
Admin. 4-501. In other words, once faced with a summary judgment motion tending to
demonstrate that the non-movant will not prevail, the non-movant must, on any particular claim,
demonstrate the existence of facts in the record which would allow a finding in her favor on "the
essential elements of his [or her] claim." Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124
(Utah 1994).
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In this case, Plaintiff failed to controvert the majority of the factual assertions contained
in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. In many instances, although attempting to object
to them, Plaintiff cited no contrary fact in the record and no well-taken objection. In other
instances, Plaintiff attempted to controvert the facts by challenging their legal significance or
with the legal conclusion that the 1976 agreement "waived each and every requirement" by citing
to extrinsic evidence of intent that is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. Finally, in
many instances, the portions of the record cited by Plaintiff to controvert a fact simply did not
support the fact she asserted it stood for. See R. 1460-1464.

II.

Plaintiff Failed to Preserve Issues II and III and is Therefore Not Entitled to
Review of Those Issues.

Plaintiff raises two issues in her brief-in-chief which were not preserved in the record
below. Issue II is a claim that the trial court retroactively applied the Utah Pyramid Scheme Act.
Issue HI is a claim that the trial court's ruling violates contracts clauses of the Utah and United
States Constitutions. The court will search in vain for any reference, however obscure, to either
issue in the record.
It is fundamental that an issue must be preserved below in order for an examination of the
issue by the appellate court. The Utah Court of Appeals has summarized the requirements for
preservation:
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first raise the issue before the trial
court. A matter is sufficiently raised if it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is
afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue. For a court to be afforded an opportunity to
rule on the issue, several requirements must be met. First, the issue must be raised in a
timely fashion. To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely bring the
issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an opportunity to rule on
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the issue's merits. Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion are deemed
waived, precluding [the appellate court from considering their merit on appeal.] Second,
the issue must be specifically raised such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a level of
consciousness before the trial court. Third, the party must introduce to the trial court
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority to support its arguments.
Hart v. Salt Lake County, 945 P.2d 125, 129-30 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(internal citations and
quotations omitted)(emphasis added). In the present case Appellant does not satisfy any of these
requirements.
The issues of retroactive application of a statute and of the contract's clause claims were
simply never raised before the trial court. Plaintiffs brief expressly claims that both issues II and
m were preserved in the trial court record at pages 297, 1030 and 1427-28.8 Plaintiff provides
the selfsame citations for both issues. Page 297 of the record corresponds to page 7 of the
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. At no point on that page or elsewhere in that pleading is there any mention
of a claim of retroactive application of a statute or the contracts clause. Indeed, it would have
been most surprising to present such an argument in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of her
Motion for Summary Judgment since both the retroactivity argument and the contact's clause
arguments are rejoinders to the Defendants' argument that the Plaintiffs contract is illegal and
void. Such matters would not be found in Plaintiffs Summary Judgment memo-in-chief but
only in a reply memo.
Plaintiffs citation to the record at page 1030 is similarly misplaced. Page 1030
corresponds to page 22 of Plaintiff s Reply to Defendants' memorandum in opposition to
summary judgment. Again, no mention of the issue of retroactivity or the contracts clause is

8. For the court's convenience, these pages of the record are reproduced in the Addendum.
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mentioned on the cited page, nor anywhere else in that document. Pages 1427-28 correspond to
pages 22 and 23 of the Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss. The paragraph which spans these
two pages is the only response Plaintiff makes in any pleadings to Defendants' argument that
Plaintiffs contract is illegal. However, Plaintiff cites neither case nor statute nor does she refer
to retroactivity and does not suggest that the state or federal contracts clause in any way
precludes or supplants the assertions made by the Plaintiff. Plaintiffs citations to the record, far
from demonstrating that these issues have been preserved for appeal, demonstrate that there has
been no preservation of the issues of retroactivity or the contract clause for review.9 See Rocky
Mountain Thrift Stores Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 887 P.2d 848, 850 (Utah 1994)(holding fact

9. Footnote 1 of the Plaintiffs brief provides "[a] transcript of the May 18, 1998 oral
arguments before the Honorable Howard H. Maetani, from which the order being appealed
resulted, is not a part of the appellate record because the District Court personnel cannot locate
the video tape from that date." Plaintiff/Appellant may attempt to argue that somehow these
issues were raised during oral argument, and that she is now somehow prejudiced because she
cannot demonstrate that fact due to the loss of the record. While Defendant does not agree that
these issues were presented to the court during oral argument, Defendants observe that the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure provide a mechanism for addressing such claims. Utah R. App. P.
11(g) provides that "[the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from
the best available means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on the Appellee,
who may serve objections or propose amendments within ten days after service. The statement
and any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the trial court for settlement
and approval and, as settled and approved, shall be included by the Clerk of the trial court and
record on appeal." Plaintiff/Appellant has not availed herself of this procedure. She is thus
precluded from arguing before this court that there is any deficiency in the record.
Moreover, even if Plaintiff had presented these issues to the trial court during oral
argument, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that an argument made only during oral argument
on a motion for summary judgment was not sufficiently preserved to warrant appellate review.
Shire Dev. v. Frontier Investments, 799 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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issues cannot be raised for first time on appeal). Nowhere in the pleadings is the word
"retroactive" used; no where are any constitutional claims analyzed.
Plaintiffs appeal is her first mention of retroactivity and contracts clause. Below,
Plaintiff did not raise either issue in any specific fashion. Neither issue was brought to the trial
court's consciousness. The Court's Memorandum Decision does not even mention either issue.
Finally, neither factual nor legal authority were presented in any form to the trial court. None of
the elements of Hart are met. Hart, 945 P.2d at 129-130. See also, Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d
488, 491 (Utah 1986)(holding issues not raised in pleadings and not addressed by trial court will
not be considered on appeal).
Not only has Plaintiff failed to preserve issues II and HI for review by this court, she has
attempted to mislead this court by giving entirely fanciful citations to the record. Utah R. App.
P. 24(a)(5)(A) specifically provides that a brief must contain a citation to the record showing the
place where particular issues were preserved for appeal. "[T]o permit meaningful appellate
review, briefs must comply with the briefing requirements sufficiently to enable us to understand
what particular errors were allegedly made, where in the record these errors can be found, and
why, under applicable authorities, those errors are material ones necessitating reversal or other
relief." Burns v. Summerhaves, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Recently, on two separate occasions this court has censured an attorney who misstated
the record on appeal. Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Center, Inc., 2000 WL 1218479, *5-*8 & nn.9,
10, & 14 (Utah August 29, 2000); Boice v. Marble, 1999 WL 561528, *4 n.5 (Utah August 3,
1999). Even more than counsel's misstatements in Lieber and Boice, Plaintiffs references to the
record mislead the court. Nowhere in the record, much less in the citations provided by the
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Plaintiff are the issues of retroactivity or the contract clause ever raised. Plaintiffs argument that
somehow the record citations contain these issues is unfair and prejudicial to Defendants and to
the Court.

III.

The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that Plaintiffs Contract Was Illegal.

The trial court properly concluded that the contract Plaintiff sought to enforce was illegal
under state and federal law. For the first time on appeal, Plaintiff argues that 1) the court erred in
retroactively applying the Utah Pyramid Scheme Act to the 1976 agreement, 2) that the court's
reasoning impairs Plaintiffs contract rights contrary to the U.S. and Utah Constitutions, and 3)
that court erroneously concluded that Plaintiffs contract was illegal. These arguments will be
addressed in turn.

A.

Plaintiff Cannot Demonstrate Any Decision Which Is In Violation of the
State or Federal Contracts Clause

Plaintiff claims, in her brief, that the trial court's conclusion that Plaintiffs contract is
void under the contracts clause of both the Utah and United States Constitution.10 Plaintiff failed
to provide any analysis or even raise this issue before the trial court and thus we do not have the
benefit of developed briefing and the trial court's view of the issue. Plaintiffs briefing before
this court is similarly deficient. The Plaintiff simply cites to a single Utah case, George v. Oren
Ltd. & Assoc, 672 P.2d 732 (Utah 1983), for the proposition that even if the trial court were to

10. Plaintiff fails to show or argue any distinction between the federal and state contracts
clauses. Accordingly, the court should assume that the issues are identical. Brunner v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 945 P.2d 687, 689 n.3 (Utah 1997)(holding that failure to separately analyze
state and federal constitutional claims results in analysis of federal claims only), citing, State v.
Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 873 n.6 (Utah), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 865 (1993).
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find that Utah's Antipyramid Scheme Act prohibited Plaintiffs contract, it could not be applied
in this case because of the contract's clause. This reading is puerile.
Quoting George, the Plaintiff recites:
It is well settled that in the exercise of its police power, a state can enact regulations or
laws reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort or general welfare
of the community regardless of whether such laws or regulations affect contracts
incidentally, directly, or indirectly.
George, 672 P.2d at 737. The Plaintiff then simply concludes that "[e]ven if Utah Code Ann. §
76-6a-l et seq. is a proper exercise by the State of its police power ... the trial court may not
impair Mrs. Peterson's contract rights that were in existence immediately prior to [the][sic]
enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-2(4).n
As presented to the trial court, the law regarding multi-level marketing is a complex
interaction of both state and federal law and has evolved over the course of many years. There is
certainly no dispute that states can regulate multilevel marketing organizations even to the point
of retroactively terminating contracts. See, Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. Dranev, 530 P.2d 108,
113 (Nev. 1974)("Although [multilevel distributorship] contracts previously entered into may be
effected thereby, the constitutional interdiction against the impairment of the obligation of
contract does not prevent a state in the reasonable exercise of its police power from enacting laws
intended to benefit the public").
Moreover, as the trial court found, multi-level marketing law requires a distinct and
tangible nexus between one's receipt of income and one's efforts in a multi-level marketing

11. This court has also noted that "[t]he right of the Legislature to act under the police power
of the state is a part of the existing law at the time of the execution of every contract, and as such
becomes in contemplation of law a part of that contract." George, 672 P.2d at 738, quoting
Lavton v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 383 P.2d 624, 627 (Okla. 1963).
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program. This has been the law for decades and it pre-dates the contract upon which Plaintiff
sues. In Re Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1106, 1181 (1975), affirmed sub nom., Turner
v. F.T.C., 580 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Plaintiffs view of her contract is that she is released
from any obligation to do anything. Her view of the contract is prima facie illegal under the law
as it existed in 1976, and certainly as it has since developed. See, e.g., Webster v. Omnitrition
Inter. Inc., 79 F.3d 776, 780-82 (9th Cir. 1996), cert, denied, 117 S.Ct. 174 (1996).
Moreover, the record demonstrates that Defendant terminated payments to Plaintiff in an
ongoing effort to maintain compliance with multi-level marketing law. The trial court's decision
regarding illegality was not merely that the Utah Pyramid Scheme Act forbade the contract, but
that the law, both statutory and common, invalidated the contract. See Memorandum Decision p.
10. The contracts clause simply does not operate as a brake upon judicial actions. George, 672
P.2d at 738.
The trial court reasonably and accurately concluded that the 1976 contract was illegal
based upon both statutory and common law. As judicial developments make clear, Plaintiffs
contract would be an illegal pyramid scheme, at least as she would construe it. As such it is void.
The contracts clause does not preclude or even effect this conclusion. Plaintiffs claim that her
rights under the state or federal contracts clause have been violated is not well taken.

B. There Is No Retroactivity Issue in This Case.
Plaintiff also claims that the trial court retroactively applied Utah's anti-pyramid statute.
This is simply in error. Multi-level marketing law has required for over twenty-five years that
Plaintiff must engage in certain activities which connect her personal efforts to the return she is
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personally receiving. In Re Koscot Interplanetary, 86 F.T.C. at 1181; In Re Amway, 93 F.T.C.
618, 716 (1979). As the trial court concluded, however, Plaintiffs claim is that she should
receive the benefit of her contract without any effort on her part. See also Memorandum
Decision p. 10 (concluding that such actions violate both the Utah anti-pyramid statute and In Re
Am way).
Plaintiffs analysis of retroactivity demonstrates why she cannot prevail: there was no
retroactive application of law; the trial court held Plaintiff to law which predated the 1976
agreement. The Utah statute is merely a latter statutory expression of the pre-existing common
law and regulating law. There is no retroactivity issue here; doubtless that is why Plaintiffs brief
gives it such short shrift and why the issue was not raised below. It should be rejected here.

C.

The Trial Court Properly Determined That Plaintiffs Contract Was
Unenforceable and Was Therefore Correct in Granting Summary Judgment
to Defendants.

The trial court properly determined that Plaintiffs interpretation of her 1976 agreement
would render it illegal under both state and federal law. Plaintiff claims that the 1976 writing
gives her a right to receive monthly cash payments, irrespective of any continuing action or duty,
based solely on her sponsorship of the Farnsworth's down-line. She claims this right is
completely free of any obligation on her part to have retail sales or to provide any training or
promotional efforts with or to her down-line.
Utah law defines a "pyramid scheme" as:
any sales device or plan under which a person gives consideration to another person in
exchange for compensation or the right to receive compensation which is derived
primarily from the introduction of other persons into the sales device or plan rather than
from the sale of goods, services, or other property.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-2(4). In State v. Hall, 905 P.2d 899, 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the
Utah Court of Appeals rejected a claim that this provision was ambiguous and properly noted
that it prohibits any "plan under which a person gives consideration to another person in
exchange for . . . the right to receive compensation which is derived primarily from the
introduction of other persons into the sales device or plan rather than from the sale of goods,
services or property." (emphasis in original).
Multi-level marketing has a long and complex history. Often such systems were attacked
as pyramid schemes, illegal securities, lotteries, deceptive trade practices, restraints on trade, or
chain letters.12 Ultimately, the FTC developed a series of criteria which supposedly offered a
safe harbor for multi-level plans. In Re Amway Corp., 93 F.T.C. at 646 & 668.
Utah's statutory scheme is also consistent with federal law. The Federal Trade
Commission has, for over twenty-five years, defined a pyramid scheme as a system
characterized by the payment by participants of money to the company in return for which
they receive (1) the right to sell a product and (2) the right to receive in return for
recruiting other participants into the program rewards which are unrelated to the sale of
the product to the ultimate user.
In Re Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 86 F.T.C. at 1181. The second element of the Koscot test is the
"sine qua non of a pyramid scheme." Webster v. Omnitrition Inter., Inc., 79 F.3d at 781. This
requirement predates Plaintiffs contract, which cannot meet the Koscot test.
The Ninth Circuit - a very relevant jurisdiction given Defendant Sunrider's relocation in
1986 to Torrance, California - has recently concluded that even a multi-level marketing company

12. For a recent case with a discussion of what distinguishes a legitimate multi-level
marketing plan from illegal pyramid schemes, see U.S. v. Gold Unlimited, Inc., 177 F.3d 472 (61
Cir. 1999).
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modeled on the system approved In Re Amway can still be held liable as an illegal pyramid
scheme, an illegal security, a deceptive trade practice, and a violation of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act, as well as a variety of related state claims when compensation
paid to individual participants is based on recruitment or sponsorship rather than the sale of
product. Webster, 79 F.3d at 782-83 ("the key to any anti-pyramiding rule . . . is that the rule
must serve to tie recruitment bonuses to actual retail sales in some way"). The Webster court
noted that "[t]he promise of lucrative rewards for recruiting others tends to induce participants to
focus on the recruitment side of business at the expense of their retail marketing efforts." Id.
Plaintiffs contract implicates precisely these concerns.
Defendant Sunrider's president testified that one of the reasons for cutting off payments
to Plaintiff was the concern of compliance with the law. The record is undisputed that Defendant
Sunrider has modified its Business Guides to ensure that there is a relationship between the sale
of product and the Leadership Development Bonuses, and therefore, Sunrider had instituted its
five retail sales rule together with requiring recipients of Leadership Development Bonuses to
meet the definition of a Sales Leader. Although she has admitted that it would not have been
difficult to meet the definition of a "Sales Leader," Plaintiff refused to undertake the efforts that
would make her receipt of Leadership Development Bonuses related to sales and comply with the
law.
Before the trial court, Plaintiffs sole argument relating to illegality was that her
commissions were based upon the sales of her down-line, and accordingly, were not violative of
anti-pyramid laws. R. 1427. To the contrary, Plaintiff s Leadership Development bonuses must
be related to her personal efforts in conducting retail sales and the training and support of her
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down-line. The trial court noted, "Sunrider has adopted certain requirements in recent years to
comply with anti-pyramid law, and Plaintiff claims that these requirements do not apply to her. . .
. It seems that Plaintiff is gaining the benefits of Sunrider's anti-pyramid requirements while
refusing to comply with the requirements herself." R. 1576.
Accordingly, the trial court appropriately determined that "as a matter of law that
receiving bonuses in a multi-marketing business is illegal when the bonuses are based only upon
sponsoring of an organization, rather than upon promoting a product, selling a product, or
training and supervising down-line distributors." R. 1576. Because the record was undisputed
that Plaintiff was doing none of these things, summary judgment was properly granted in this
matter.

IV.

Given the Plain Language of the 1976 Agreement, Plaintiff Cannot Succeed
on Her Contract Claim

Plaintiff simply cannot succeed on her contract claims. It is virtually undisputed that the
1976 writing cannot constitute the entire contract between the parties. Without reference to a
Business Guide, the 1976 writing is devoid of discernable meaning. Moreover, the plain
language of the 1976 writing waives only a single requirement, not every requirement as Plaintiff
claims. In addition, it is clear the 1976 writing was modified by subsequent Sunrider Business
Guides. Finally, the Plaintiff failed to adduce evidence sufficient to sustain her burden of
proving damages.
A.

The 1976 Writing Was Not the Whole Agreement
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Plaintiffs contract claim is premised on the 1976 writing between Lloyd Peterson
(Plaintiffs deceased husband) and Ken Murdock:
I, Lloyd Peterson, do hereby offer to purchase from NaturaLife International the
NaturaLife Distributors known as Sharon and John Farnsworth (husband and wife) and
their sponsored organization for the sum of $1500 (one thousand five hundred dollars).
This amount will be reduced by NaturaLife International from salary due me. It is
understood that this purchase will become effective at 11:49 p.m. on July 31, 1976, and
from that time on, the above Farnsworth NaturaLife organization will become first
level distributors or directors as the case may be to my wife, Janet S. Peterson. It is
also specified that my wife, Janet Peterson, will remain a director with the company
for the purpose of receiving overrides from directors occurring to organization
regardless of her personal purchase volume (PV) level. I do understand, however, that
her personal group PV for those below director level will be paid at the scheduled rate for
the PV level reached each month.
/s/ Lloyd D. Peterson
The NaturaLife International company accepts the offer of Lloyd D. Peterson for the
purchase of the sponsorship of John and Sharon Farnsworth and their sponsored
organization as distributors and/or directors as through they had been originally
directly sponsored by Janet S. Peterson. The purchase price and terms are approved as
written in the proposal.
/s/ Ken Murdock
R. 1295(emphasis added). It is undisputed that this writing does not constitute the complete
agreement between the parties. On its face, this document fails to define the terms "overrides' or
indicate when they are to be paid, how they are to be calculated, or what requirement must be
met to receive them. In fact, in the absence of a Business Guide, the agreement has absolutely no
meaning.
Plaintiff herself testified as follows:
Q.

A.

Okay, Does Exhibit 1 contain all the terms of the agreement you had with
NaturaLife? By that I mean, does this contain every term or obligation in the
agreement that is at issue here in this litigation?
I don't know.
MR. Seller: That's a fair response.
-30-

Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

(By Mr. Stevenson) That is a fair response. You testified earlier that NaturaLife
had another document that would have spelled out what percentage of the volume
would be an override or would be the overrides to which you would be entitled to;
is that correct?
Yes. I believe they had in—
There was some other document out there that spelled out what those percentages
were?
I believe so.
Okay. And I think you also testified that there was some other document that
spelled out the scheduled rate that's referred to in Exhibit 1; is that correct?
Yes.
Okay. Is it fair to say that that other document, then, also contained the terms of
the agreement between Lloyd Peterson?
It must have, you know. I'm not saying that—
Okay.
-specifically it was exactly that, because he used those words.
Okay. Would you agree that Exhibit 1, for example, does not specify what that
scheduled rate is, or what—
It was a scheduled rate at that time. And—
But for us to know what the scheduled rate is, we have to look at that document;
is that a fair statement?
I believe he's referring to the scheduled rate as—as whatever happens. And the
schedules do change.
The schedules do change?
Uh-huh.
How do they change?
Well, like Sunrider's changed their schedules every now and then—
Okay.
—to be a little different. NaturaLife had changed theirs. But at the time of the
scheduled rate or whenever that is.
Okay. So there was a document out there that changed periodically that spelled
out what those rates were?
Yes.
Okay. And those rates changed from time to time?
They could.
Okay. And you testified that today under Sunrider a similar document or business
guide changes from time to time?
When they want--if they feel that things aren't quite right, you know, like the
company put from $2,000 to $3,000 for their bonus volume.
Okay. If we wanted to determine today, for example, how to calculate an override
that was due you, for example, would we have to look at the Sunrider business
guide, then, to determine the scheduled rate or percentages?
I believe so, yes.
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R. 1268-1270, Deposition of Janet Peterson (emphasis added).
Accordingly, to determine the terms of her agreement, and whether it had been breached, the
court must look at the 1976 writing and the most recent Sunrider Business Guide. Significantly,
as Plaintiff acknowledged Sunrider "could" make changes to the Business Guide "when they
want—if they feel that things aren't quite right." Id. (emphasis added). The 1976 writing
incorporated the terms and concepts of the Business Guides.

B.

The 1976 Writing Cannot Be Understood Without Reference to the Business
Guides

Only in light of the Business Guides is the 1976 writing seen in its true context. The
Business Guide sets forth duties and responsibilities of participants. By its plain terms, the 1976
writing relieves Plaintiff of but a single duty: the obligation to maintain personal purchase
volume. The 1976 writing waives nothing else. In fact, Mr. Murdock's acceptance specifically
points out that Plaintiffs relationship to the company will be "as though [Farnsworth] had been
originally directly sponsored by Janet S. Peterson." 1976 Agreement. In other words, Plaintiff is
an ordinary distributor, having a sponsorship relationship to the Famsworths, "and will remain a
director of the company for the purposes of receiving overrides from directors occurring to her
organization regardless of her personal purchase volume (PV) level." (Emphasis added).
Accordingly, the only obligation waived by the 1976 writing is the obligation to maintain
personal purchase volume.
Under the 1994 Business Guide, which was the version applicable at the time her
payments were stopped, the following requirements were in place:
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a.

To maintain her status as a distributor and to prevent her distributorship from
being terminated, the Company Direct account had to purchase some product in
the preceding 12 month period.

b.

To qualify to receive commissions, all distributorships are required to do the
following: i) purchase 100 SV a month, and ii) to make and document five retail
sales per month.

c.

To qualify to receive Leadership Development Bonuses, a director is required to
maintain the current Personal Group SV of 3,000 a month and to meet the
definition of a "Sale Leader."

R. 733-735, 756, 758. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did none of those things.
On its face, the 1976 writing only relieved Plaintiff of her obligation of personal PV for
the purpose of her remaining a director. It says nothing about waiving minimum requirements
imposed on distributors like purchasing product at least once a year. Even given the broadest
conceivable interpretation, the 1976 writing says nothing about waiving the five retail sales a
month requirement, the group sales requirement of 3,000 SV per month, or meeting the
definition of a "Sales Leader."13 Accordingly, under the express terms of the 1976 agreement,
Plaintiff was not relieved of other requirements.

C.

Rules of Contract Construction Also Preclude Plaintiff's Claim

13. Plaintiff testified in her deposition that it would not have been difficult to meet the
requirements of being a "Sales Leader." R. 1243-1244.
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Notwithstanding this express language, Plaintiff has attempted to argue that the phrase
"regardless of her personal purchase volume" actually means any and all requirements (both
present and future) for remaining a distributor and qualifying as a director. Plaintiff should
not be heard to attempt to expand the 1976 writing so far beyond its plain and specific terms.
In construing a contract, the first issue for the court to address is whether or not the
contract is integrated. Bailey-Allen, Inc. v. Kurzet 945 P.2d 180, 190-91 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
An integrated contract is a written contract which the parties intend to constitute the final written
expression of their agreement. Id. Integration can be shown through an integration clause or
through evidence of the parties, but it is generally a fact question.14 However, there is also a
presumption that a contract appearing to be complete and certain is integrated. Union Bank v.
Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985).
There can be little dispute that the 1976 writing, together with the most recent Sunrider
Business Guides, constituted the final, complete, written expression of the agreement between
the parties. Pursuant to this agreement, Plaintiff is the sponsor of the Farnsworth down line "as
though they had been originally directly sponsored by Janet S. Peterson" and "Janet Peterson will
remain a director of the company for the purpose of receiving overrides from directors occurring
to her organization regardless of her personal purchase volume (PV) level." 1976 writing,
Exhibit A.
Since the 1976 writing and the Business Guides together constitute an integrated contract,
parol evidence is inadmissible to vary, modify, or supplement its terms, except to explain

14. The 1978, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993 and 1994 Business Guides all
contained an integration or merger clause,
-34-

ambiguities. Hall v. Process Instruments & Controls, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Utah 1995).
Even as to a integrated contract, parol evidence is admissible only to supplement, but not
contradict, the written expression of the agreement. Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 804 P.2d 547,
551 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), quoting, Stanger v. Sentinel Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah
1983). Plaintiff has never agreed that the 1976 writing was ambiguous in any way. Accordingly,
Plaintiff cannot fairly argue that the 1976 writing waived any requirement other than personal
purchase volume, now called Sales Volume. Plaintiffs interpretation does violence to the plain
meaning of the 1976 writing and exposes the company to legal jeopardy.
Defendants anticipate Plaintiff will attempt to point to the deposition testimony of Ken
Murdock, prior owner and operator of NaturaLife International, Inc., who expressed his
understanding regarding "intent" in 1976.15 Mr. Murdock's testimony is inadmissible to
contradict the express terms of the 1976 agreement. In fact, if the court determines the
agreement is integrated, Mr. Murdock's testimony may not even be used to supplement the
express terms set forth in the 1976 writing. Webb, 804 P.2d at 551. Moreover, because Mr.
Murdock's testimony conflicts with Plaintiffs testimony wherein she testified that we would
look to the Sunrider Business Guide to determine her damages today, Plaintiff should be
estopped from changing her position in the matter.
In light of Plaintiffs testimony that the Sunrider Business Guides constituted an essential
part of the agreement and that Sunrider "could" change the Business Guides "when they want-

15. In her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiff made no attempt to respond to Defendants' analysis that the parol evidence rule barred
Ken Murdock from offering extrinsic evidence to contradict the express terms of the 1976
agreement. Having completely failed to argue this point below, Plaintiff should not be permitted
to address this issue for the first time on appeal.
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if they feel that things aren't quite right", she must prove her breach of contract case in the
context of the contract she herself acknowledges. Even if Plaintiffs interpretation is given the
broadest interpretation, that it somehow waived all personal PV requirements for remaining a
director, Plaintiff can not fairly argue that minimum distributor purchase requirements, personal
group SV requirements, Sales Leader and the five retail sales requirements were waived.
Because the record is clear Plaintiff has not met these requirements, she is not entitled to receive
the Leadership Development Bonuses she is suing to collect. Accordingly, the trial court
properly granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

D. Exhibit A Has Been Superceded By The Sunrider Business Guides Through
Plaintiffs Conduct
Implicit in Judge Maetani's ruling is the conclusion that Sunrider could impose rules to
insure its marketing plan did not violate evolving law. This conclusion is consistent with a far
simpler contact analysis of this case: The 1976 agreement long ago ceased to have any legal
import because it was entirely superceded by the Sunrider Business Guides as they evolved and
Plaintiff accepted the benefits thereof aware of the changes.
As Plaintiff has testified, Sunrider "could" change the Business Guides "when they
want--if they feel that things aren't quite right". Indeed, the Business Guides have changed
substantially since 1976.16 For example, the number of levels upon which Leadership
Development Bonuses have been paid has fluctuated between one and three. Similarly, the
percentages at which the Leadership Development Bonuses are calculated has varied with a

16. As far back as the 1978, the Business Guide expressly provided that Defendant Sunrider
(Naturalife) could amend the Business guide when it sought fit. R. 679.
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significant effect on Plaintiffs payments. These changes have, over time, resulted in both
benefits and detriments to Plaintiff. Likewise, Plaintiff has had the benefit of Sunrider's overall
growth and its increase in products and programs.
Plaintiff testified that she routinely reviewed the Sunrider Business Guides to keep
abreast of the changes. This was a practice she never stopped. It is undisputed that when these
changes were put into effect, Plaintiff made no complaint, a fact which is consistent with her
testimony that Sunrider "could" make changes to its Business Guide whenever it wanted. Thus,
Plaintiff has acknowledged the unilateral nature of the Sunrider Business Guides, and that
Plaintiff has duly accepted all the terms in the Business Guides as she has accepted payments
with the knowledge of the changes. When changes adversely affected her, she accepted
diminished payments without reservation or complaint. Likewise, Plaintiff benefitted when her
Leadership Development Bonuses went from being calculated one level deep at 8% to three
levels deep at 6%-3%-l% resulting in more than a 400% increase.
As Plaintiff correctly argues, an offer plus acceptance, supported by consideration, results
in an enforceable contract. Similarly, "the cashing or depositing of the check [by Plaintiff] is an
exercise of dominion over [Defendant's] funds, and regardless of the intention, [Plaintiff] is
estopped from denying that the offer was accepted." 1 Corbin on Contracts § 3.21, p. 425
(1995)(emphasis added). This rule is fundamentally just: one cannot accept benefits, remain
silent, and then disavow the increased burden the increase in benefits naturally brings.
In an analogous case, a man entered into employment with Bechtel Corp. His
employment contract provided for certain "uplifts" to his base salary. After his employment
commenced, Bechtel altered its payment scheme, substantially reducing payments and making
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other modifications to the employment plan. The employee took advantage of the changes to
terminate his employment early and qualify for benefits, none of which would have been
available under the original contract. Following his separation from the company, he brought
suit under the original contract. The trial court found that by accepting the benefits of the new
contract, the employee could not claim benefits under the original contract. Like Plaintiff in the
present case, the employee claimed that he never accepted the altered contract. The Utah Court
of Appeals disagreed:
By continuing employment with Bechtel under the terms of the revised compensation
plan without taking any action to collect the "uplifts" and without making any oral or
written demand for the monies, Tthe employee] indicated by his conduct that he accepted
Bechtel's revised compensation plan.
*

*

*

Most importantly, however, because the check included benefits [the employee] would
not have been entitled to under the parties' original contract, [the employee's] negotiation
of the check conclusively established [his] acceptance of the revised compensation plan.
Therefore, we hold that [the employee's] conduct in failing to demand the "uplifts"
during the period of January 1, 1982 to January 31, 1983, cashing the check and accepting
the benefits under the revised compensation plan constituted an accord and satisfaction.
Bench v. Bechtel Civil & Minerals, Inc., 758 P.2d 460, 461-62 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(citations
and quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
As in Bench, by accepting without protest both increased and decreased benefits as
Defendant changed the Business Guides, Plaintiff unambiguously, "conclusively," and as a
matter of law, accepted the modified Business Guides. Id. Having accepted payments under
Business Guides as they have changed since 1976, Plaintiff cannot now argue that she did not
assent to the changes.
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In another case, a Mr. Trembly claimed to have an employment contract which limited
the manner in which he could be terminated. Sometime after he was hired, the company
promulgated an employee handbook expressly reserving the right to terminate persons "at will."
Trembly was eventually terminated and he brought suit for breach of contract. The Utah Court of
Appeals rejected Trembly's argument that he had not consented to the handbook which
contravened the contract he claimed existed:
[I]f an employee has knowledge of a distributed handbook that changes a condition of the
employee's employment, and the employee remains in the company's employ, the
modified conditions become part of the employee's employment contract. Further, in this
manner, an original employment contract may be modified or replaced by a subsequent
unilateral contract. The employee's retention of employment constitutes acceptance of
the offer of a unilateral contract; by continuing to stay on the job, although free to leave,
the employment supplies the necessary consideration for the offer.
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1312-13 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(citations and
quotations omitted). Trembly, like the present case, demonstrates that a prior contractual
relationship may be unilaterally modified, and that accepting benefits while aware that changes
had been made, without reservation, constitutes an unequivocal acceptance of all the terms.
In many respects, the instant case is far clearer than the facts in Bench or Trembly.
Unlike the facts in Bench or Trembly, Plaintiff has been accepting the payments aware of the
numerous changes since 1976. Moreover, unlike Bench or Trembly, Plaintiff herself
acknowledges the necessity and application of the Sunrider Business Guides, and that Sunrider
"could" change them whenever it wanted. By accepting continued payments, both to her
detriment and benefit, with the knowledge that Sunrider had changed its Business Guides,
Plaintiff accepted all the changes made in the Business Guides over the years. Accordingly,
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whatever the 1976 writing may have stood for, it has been superceded by the new Business
Guides, like Bench and Trembly.
Because Plaintiff has failed to qualify for leadership Development Bonuses as outlined in
the 1994 Sunrider Business Guide, her breach of contract claim is unsupportable in light of her
assent to changes in the agreement. Accordingly, the trial court erred by failing to grant
Defendants' Summary Judgment on the basis that the 1976 agreement had been modified and or
superceded.

VI.

The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The trial court made no error in denying Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment.
She was not entitled to it. Her brief makes two points: one, that any "modification" is void under
the statute of frauds and two, that the policy guides could not modify the contract. Neither point
is well taken.

A.

Plaintiffs Resort to the Statute of Frauds Is Erroneous

Plaintiff claims that the statute of frauds bars any modifications of the 1976 writing.
Plaintiff seeks refuge in Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1), which provides that "every agreement that
by its term is not to be performed within in one year from the making of the agreement [is void
unless written and signed by the party to be charged]." Plaintiffs incantation of the statute of
frauds is merely a red herring.
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First, this portion of the statute of frauds applies literally. Only contracts which by their
terms could not be completed within one year are void under the statute. Heslop v. Bank of
Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 836 (Utah 1992). If any contingent event could conceivably complete the
contract within a year, the contract is vouchsafed against the statute of frauds. Zions Service
Corp. v. Danielson, 366 P.2d 982, 985 (Utah 1961). In the present case the contract could have
been completed within a year and therefore the statute of frauds did not require a writing.
Plaintiff claims that there exists a contract between her and Defendant Sunrider obligating
Defendant to make payments to her on a monthly basis. When she dies, any obligation to pay
dies as well. Therefore, the contract could be performed within a year, thus, the statute of frauds
does not apply. Zion's Service Corp., 366 P.2d at 985; Johnson v. Johnson, 88 P. 230, 231 (Utah
1906).
Second, Plaintiffs argument simply ignores the fact that the modifications -the Business
Guides- are obviously written documents. Plaintiffs acceptance of the changes -both favorable
and unfavorable- wrought by the business guides was manifest by her actions. The checks
together with the business guides, themselves are writings, accepted and signed by the Plaintiff.
Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 844 P.2d
322, 326 (Utah 1992); Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v. Great N. Baseball Co., 748 P.2d 1058,
1060 (Utah 1987). Together they form a writing which satisfies the statute of frauds, were it
applicable.
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B.

Without the Business Guides, the 1976 Writing Is Meaningless and Plaintiff's
Claims Must Fail

Finally, it is fatal to the Plaintiffs case to exclude the business guides as she now seems
to desire. It is undisputed that the 1976 writing cannot be understood without referring to the
business guides. It is incomplete on its face. "It is fundamental that the memorandum which is
relied upon to satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all the essential terms and provisions of
the contract." English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), citing
Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 242 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah 1952), Collett v. Goodrich, 231 P.2d
730 (Utah 1951) and Hawaiian Equipment Co. V. Eimco Corp., 207 P.2d 794 (1949). Plaintiff
relies upon the 1976 writing to satisfy the statute of frauds. However, if the business guides are
beyond consideration, Plaintiff cannot prove her case. Without the business guides, the 1976
writing is meaningless.
In her Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff originally sought an award of damages in
the amount of $3,500 per month. This claim was based upon the amounts Plaintiff testified she
had been receiving in the months before her termination. R. 299. Of course, this amount was
based upon the formula for calculating Leadership Development bonuses in place at the time she
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was terminated.17 In addition, Plaintiff requested all future amount that would become due in a
lump sum.
Plaintiff must establish, to a degree of reasonable certainty, the amount of her damages
under that 1976 writing. Castillo v. Atlanta Casualty Co., 939 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Utah Ct. App.
1997). Plaintiff has adduced absolutely no evidence of what these damages would be, and of
course, the 1976 agreement does not help her. Indeed, she has made no attempt whatsoever to
inform the court what the 1976 writing might require. Plaintiff admits that the 1976 writing is
not complete. Her memorandum makes no attempt, however, to analyze how damages should be
awarded under that writing. Instead, Plaintiff claims damage under the business guides, while
simultaneously professing their inapplicability.
It is fundamental that damages for breach of contract "are properly measured by the
amount necessary to place the non-breaching party in as good a position as if the contract had
been performed." ProMax Dev. Co. V. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 258 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Since
Plaintiff claims the 1976 writing was not and could not be modified, it is incumbent upon her to
prove, with reasonable certainty, what her damages would be under that contract.

17. In her Reply Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs theory changed
and for the first time she claimed and entitlement to damages calculated according to the 1978
Business Guide which is the last version available. Because the formula used in 1978 was at
10%-3%-l% as opposed to the 6%-2%-l% she has been receiving since 1985, the amounts
would be far different than the approximate $3,500 a month she claimed was due and owning in
her complaint and in her brief in chief. As noted in the statement of facts, Leadership
Development bonuses have not been calculated using the 1978 formula since 1980. On appeal,
Plaintiff appears to again be seeking bonuses based upon the $3,500 a month theory as her record
cite for this claimed amount is her deposition testimony indicating this was the approximate
amount she had been receiving in the months before her termination. See R.249, 299.
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Instead, Plaintiff has taken the amounts Defendant paid her under the business guides and
attempted to claim that amount as her damages. She can't have it both ways. Either she must
present evidence -not conjecture- of her damages under the 1976 writing or she must accept the
fact that she is dependent upon them.
Only if Plaintiff accepts the latter proposition -that the business guides replaced the 1976
writing- can she then proceed to demonstrate what damages would be appropriate to return to the
position she would have been in. She must provide evidence demonstrating that her figure of
$3,500 per month would constitute her damages to a reasonable certainty. She has failed to
present any such evidence, and the testimony of Kenny Jordan indicates that if any amount is
owing, it is substantially less than the $3,500 a month figure claimed by Plaintiff. R. 339.
Past due amounts are not the limit of Plaintiffs claims, however. Plaintiff also claims to
be entitled to a lump sum award of future damages. Curiously, in asking for such a lump sum
award, Plaintiff does not give a liquidated amount for such future damages. There are two
reasons for this; first, Plaintiff has no way to calculate such an amount on the evidence adduced
and second, Plaintiff is conflating tort damages and contract damages.
Plaintiff receives payment as a participant in a compensation plan established by
Defendant. Under this plan, 14.0 % of Sunrider's company-wide SV is set aside to pay
Leadership Development Bonuses in accordance with a formula that looks to the group sales of
Plaintiffs downline. Accordingly, the future value of Defendant's interest in Defendant's
marketing plan is inextricably connected to both Sunrider's overall company sales performance
as well as the value of sales consummated by numerous individuals downline from Plaintiff.
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Plaintiff has presented absolutely no evidence of the corporate performance of Defendant,
has made no attempt to study its business and project into the future, nor to forecast the
individual performance of those upon whom Plaintiff relies for her payments. Plaintiff has
presented no evidence of likely future income from her contract; no evidence of inflation or
reasonable returns on investment dollars; no information regarding the relative risk of investing
in Defendant's business as opposed to other investments. She has retained no economists,
accountants, stock brokers, or other experts qualified to give financial information. And yet,
having failed to present any such evidence, Plaintiff demands a lump sum of future payments.
Absent such information, Plaintiffs claim cannot prevail. Anesthesiologists Assocs. v. St.
Benedict's Hospital 852 P.2d 1030, 1042 (Ct. App. 1991), overruled on other grounds, 884 P.2d
1236, 1237 (Utah 1994).
Plaintiffs request for future damages is inappropriate for another reason. In effect, this is
a request that the court imply an acceleration clause into the 1976 writing. This is contrary to
basic contract law. In construing a contract, the court looks to the four corners of the document.
Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Anesthesiologists, 852 P.2d at 1035. None
of the documents in question in this case, neither the 1976 writing nor any business guide contain
an acceleration clause. When it is not clearly included in a contract, an acceleration clause will
not be implied. Sheet Metal Workers Local #76 Credit Union v. Hufnagle, 295 N.W.2d 259,
263-64 (Minn. 1980), citing Kiewel Securities Co. v. Knutson, 211 N.W. 1 (Minn. 1926) and
General Electric Credit Corp. V. Castiglione, 360 A.2d 418, 422 (N.J. Super. 1976). Absent an
express acceleration clause, Plaintiff is not entitled to claim the benefits of one. Pursuant to the
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Business Guides, Leadership Development Bonus payments are calculated and due only on a
monthly basis. As a result, Plaintiff is not entitled to a lump sum award of future damages.
Conclusion
It is undisputed that the 1976 writing has no meaning or existence without reference to
the Business Guides. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff failed to comply with reasonable terms
included in the Business Guide for a substantial period of time. Her failure to comply constitutes
a breach justifying her termination. Equally important, it is undisputed that Plaintiff received
benefits under the Business Guides and accepted adjustments to the calculation formulae under
which she received both increased and decreased compensation. Having accepted these benefits,
she is bound to accept the burdens attendant to the benefits.
To require any less of Plaintiff would be to force the continuance of an illegal pyramid
scheme - a criminal act in Utah - upon Defendant. Illegal contracts are void. Such a contract
should not be enforced upon Defendant. Finally, Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient
evidence to prevail upon her claims. Absent this evidence, she cannot proceed. This court
should affirm the dismissal of the Plaintiffs claims.
DATED this ^

clay of December, 2000.
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
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1976 Agreement
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June 15, 1998 Memorandum Decision
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Excerpts of Janet Peterson Deposition

4.

Excerpts of Tei Fu Chen Deposition

5.

Record where Plaintiff/Appellant claims contracts clause and retroactivity issues were
raised in the proceedings below.

Addendum 1
J

\greement

1, Lloyd D. Peterson, do hereby offer to purchase from NaturaLife
International the NaturaLife Distributors known as Sharon and John
Farnswcrth (husband and wife) and their sponsored organization for the
sum of SI500 (one thousand five hundred dollars). This amount will be
reduced by NaturaLife International from salary due me. I t is under
stood that t h i s purchase will become effective at 11:53 p.m. on July :i ,
1975, and from thai time on, the above Farnsworth NaturaLife organization will become f i r s t level distributors or directors as the case may
be to my wife, Janet S. Peterson. I t is also specified that my wife,
Janet Peterson, will remain a director with the company for the purpose
of receiving overrides from directors occuring to her organization
regardless of her personal purchase volume (PV) level. I do understand,
however, that her personal group PV for those below director level will be paid
at the scheduled rate for the PV level reached each month.

Lloyd 0. Peterson

The NaturaLife International company accacts the offer of Lloyd D.
Peterson for the purchase of the sponscrsnip of John and Sharon Fam
and their sponsored organization as distributors and/or directors as
though they had been originally directly sponsored by Janet S. Peterson.
The purchase price and terms are approved as written in the proposal
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Addendum 2

KLED

Fourth Judicial District Court of
Utah County, State of Utah.
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CARMA B SMITH Clerk
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
f i/^/2(T/7\\ '
brUnl\((lV
Deputy
JANET PETERSON,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 960400174
DATE: JUNE 13, IWN

vs.

JUDGE: HOWARD II \

SUNRIDER CORP., dba SUNRIDER
INTERNATIONAL, and TEIFU CHEN,
Defendants.
This matter came before the Honorable Howard H. Maetani, Fourth District Court
Judge. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend, a Motion to Name an Expert Witness, a Motion to
Strike Affidavits, a Motion to Strike Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion, and a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. Defendant filed a Motion to Compell Discovery, and a Motion for
IV, I'HJR

Having reviewed the filed, memoranda and exhibits submitted by both parties, heard
oral arguments and being fully advised in the premises, the Court makes the following:
MEMORANDUM DEC IS ION
I
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

NaturaLife International, Inc. was a Utah Corporation which was incorporated

on May 27, 1976.
2.

The Defendant Tei Fu Chen acquired Na
Sale Agreement on September 24 . • -<v wnn \ne sole stockholders of

NaturaLife International, Inc., Kenneth A. Murdock and George T. Murdock, Jr.
3.

NaturaLife International, Inc.'s name was changed to Sunrider Corporation.
1

I

Sunrider International is a dba of Sunrider Corporation. The same are

collectively referred to herein as "Sunrider."
Mi Irmliiiil "1111in iniIn mi I I M I M S lis [minimi 1 lliinii^h 1 iiiiiiiiiiiilllli In 11 I niriikeln^' sales
program.
6

On July 31, 1976, Lloyd D. Peterson, the deceased spouse of the Plaintiff,

purchased from NaturaLife International, Inc., for and on behalf of the Plaintiff Mrs. Peterson, the
NaturaLife distributors known as Sharon and John Farnsworth (husband and wife), and their
sponsoi eel organization
7

Pursi MI, nl to a decision made by oi-Lin Chen, President of Sunrider, the

Defendant Sunrider refuses to pay any sums to Mrs. Peterson.
On May 3, 1995, a letter was sent to Sunrider by Mrs. Peterson's counsel by
which Mrs. Peterson demanded payment from Sunrider for all past, present, and future amounts
Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant Sunrider on March 19, 1996.
Defendant filed an Answer on May 3, 1996.
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on September

,

Defendant filed an Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, October
8, 1996.
13

Plaintiff HM m '\nr-ivnr tin i ounterdaim, Octobei

1I

Plaintiff filed a Motion and Memorandum for Partial Summary Judgment,

January 15, 1998.
Defendant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment and
Request for Hearing, February 3, 1998.
Plaintiff'tiled .i K< u\\ I Il h luuluil i I klriiiniiiiidiini ill I liiiijiiiisiliiiiiiii I'm) Summary
Judgment, February 6, 1998.
17

Plaintiff filed a Motion and Memorandum to Amend their Complaint, February

10, 1998.
Plaintiff filed a Motion and Memorandum to Name an Exr
Febr
2

19.

Defendant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Amend, February 25, 1998.

20.

Defendant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Name an Expert Witness,

March 4, 1998.
21.

Defendant filed a Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment and to

Dismiss, April 1, 1998.
22.

Defendant filed a Motion and Memorandum to Compell Discovery, April 3,

23.

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike and a Memorandum in Opposition to

1998.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss, April 16, 1998.
24.

Defendant filed a Reply Memorandum for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss,

and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Strike, April 23, 1998.

n
ISSUES
Plaintiff argues that Sunrider has breached the Contract entered into by Plaintiffs
deceased husband on her behalf by refusing to pay "commissions" on the products sold by
distributors on her "down-line." Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to meet the
requirements of a director andfirst-leveldistributor, as defined in Sunrider's Business Records,
that are in addition to her personal purchase volume.

m
ANALYSIS
MOTION TO AMEND
The Court has broad discretion in granting leave to amend. Courts have liberally
construed Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a) to "further the interest ofjustice" and to allow parties to have
their claims folly adjudicated. Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993). In the
interest ofjudicial economy and having Plaintiffs claim folly adjudicated, the Court grants
Plaintiff leave to amend. Plaintiff can add Oi Lin Chen as a defendant. Plaintiff can clarify that
"Sunrider International" is the new name of "NaturaLife International." Plaintiff can change a
typographical error in the payment termination datefromDecember 1995 to December 1994.
Defendant will be granted a fair opportunity to respond to the amended pleadings.
3

MOTION TO NAME AN EXPERT WITNESS
TheC

-

c

i
'

name MI t\\mt
*

witness toi the purpose of

cs I>f Evidence provides that "[i]f scientific,

technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence

a witness qualified as an expert.. . may testify thereto .

" Clarifying the Bonus

Recap Reports and other damage issues will assist the trier of fact in determining the appropriate
remedy if it is found there has been abreach of contract "flit- expert witness .1 ill hr |n in In nit 11
useful if the 1978 business guide is foi iiici tc • be the correct guide for calculating damages.
Defendant has adequate time to prepare for adjudication of this issue.

MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS
The Court denies Plaintiffs motion to strike the affidavits of Shai on Fat nsw 01 i:h,

is allowing Plaintiff to add a new party and name an expert witness, to be fair,
uic Court will not strike these three affidavits submitted by the Defendant. Plaintiff has adequate
time t* pt epare for adjudication of any issues relating to these three affidavits.
MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT'S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
The Court denies Plaintiffs motion to strike Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion.
The Mailing certificate indicates that Defendant's motion was mailed timely on Mai ch 11, 1998.
Because lliis motion

11I1I br w 1 irnl lin, 111111II stm 11 1 wn 1 illoriiicil complete upon mailing I If all

MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
The Court grants Defendant's motion to compel discovery Once again, the Court
wants to be fair .Although Defendant's interrogatories ma\ \u\vv IKTIIII hioudui Ilium anliciiMled,
because • the Coui t is allowing Plaintiff to add a new party and call an expert witness after the
discovery deadline, the Court will order Plaintiff to answer Defendant's interrogatories in a
manner that is not evasive or incomplete.
4

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(a) and (b), a party against whom a
claim has been made, may at any time move for a summary judgment in his favor. The motion
should be granted if".. .the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." URCP Rule 56C.
The Court denies Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff asks the
Court to grant a partial summary judgment on her first cause of action—breach of contract.
Summary judgment is appropriate if Plaintiff can show no genuine issue of material facts and that
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, after allowing all reasonable inferences in favor
of the Defendant. Estate of Covington v. Josephson. 888 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
In addition, "[o]nly when contract terms are complete, clear, and unambiguous can they be
interpreted by the judge on a motion for summary judgment." Webb v. R.O. A. General Inc.. 804
P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const.. 731 P.2d 483
(Utah 1986)). The Court cannot summarily determine there has been a breach of contract
because the terms of the contract are unclear and ambiguous.
Plaintiff contends that the 1976 writing is a valid contract because it meets the elements
of proper subject matter, competent parties, offer, acceptance, and consideration. The 1976
writing may meet these requirements, however, both parties look beyond the 1976 writing to
different business guides to determine payments and other contract terms. Obviously, the 1976
writing is not a completely integrated contract. There are at least two questions of material fact in
dispute. First, the parties dispute which business guide should be used to supplement the 1976
writing. Second, the parties dispute whether the 1976 writing waives all Director requirements or
only the requirement of personal purchase volume. Both of these facts are necessary to determine
whether there has been a breach of contract.
There is a question of material fact as to which business guide should be used.

Plaintiff

argues that the 1978 business guide should be used because the payment schedule listed in the
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1978 business guide is the same payment schedule that existed * p
drafted. Defendant argi les, relying upon Pliinliff \ fm n testimony, that the current business guide
shoi ild be used because even Plaintiflf acknowledged that Sunrider could change its business guide
unilaterally when things were not quite right. Based upon Plaintiff's testimony, it is a reasonable
inference that each new business guide combines with the 1976 writing to form an integrated
contract, or alternatively, each new business guide modifies the 1976 writing I Merminm^
of fact to be decided by a fact-finder.
There is a question of material fact as to whether the 1976 writing waives all Director
requirements oi only the requirement of personal purchase volume. Plaintiflf relies on the extrinsic
evidence of Ken Murdock, one of the original parties to the contract, to show that the inten
the parties was to keep Plaintiff a Director regai dless of an> i equii ements listed in the business
guides. Defendant argues that the face of the 1976 only waives the personal purchase volume
requirement, not any other Director requirement. It is ambiguous whether the 1976 writing
waives all Director requirements or only the requirement of personal purchase volume, and
therefore is a question of fact to be determined by a fact-finder. Also, when contract
interpretation must be determined by extrinsic eviri

kill, J Uvonu's .i i]uestion < J fact

Recor ds v. Briggs. KK7 V »d Kiv! ill liili I i A|i|i
Plaintiff argues that none of the business guides could legally modify the 1976 writing
because Plaintiff never agreed to the terms of the business guides, Plaintiff never received any
additional consideration, and Plaintiff never signed any of the business guides. This argument
puzzles the Court. Plaintiff wants the Court to treat the business guides as hemp non binding but
ri! the same time ailuiv IMaintiti In ndy uii Ilk l(|7X business guide to calculate damages. If
infill can iel\ on 1 lie (*» ?h business guide to show the payment schedule of the 1976 writing,
based upon Plaintiffs own testimony and the face of the 1976 writing, it is not an unreasonable
inference that the business guides may also contain additional requirements to the 1976 writing.
The Court cannot summarily decide there has been a bre
contract is unclear and ambiguc us.

6

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND TO DISMISS

Intentional interference with contractual relations
The Court grants Defendants motion to summarily dismiss the claim of intentional
interference with contractual relations.
Plaintiff relies on the five elements of intentional interference with contractual relations
listed in Model Utah Jury Instructions (MUJI). However, the case law requires more than the five
elements listed in MUJI. In Soter v. Wasatch Dev. Corp.. 443 P.2d 663 (Utah 1968), a case that
both parties cite, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[i]n order to establish arightto recover on
such a cause of action the plaintiffs would have to show that the defendants, without justification,
by some wrongful and malicious act, interfered with the plaintiffs' right of contract, and that
actual damage resulted." Id. at 664. Also, because Tei Fu Chen is the president of Sunrider, to
meet the requirement of "contract of another," Plaintiff must show that Tei Fu Chen "acted
beyond the scope of his powers or against the interests of the corporation," Stratton v. West
States Construction, 440 P.2d 117,118 (Utah 1968).
Plaintiff argues that Tei Fu Chen acted maliciously and outside the scope of his powers
as a Sunrider officer because he entered into discussions with various Sunrider employees for the
purpose of terminating payments to Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff offers nothing to explain why
discussing payment termination with various employees was malicious, outside the scope of
Defendant's powers, or against the interests of Sunrider. In fact, the undisputed evidence
indicates that Sunrider acted justifiably in terminating Plaintiffs payments because Plaintiff was
failing to qualify, Plaintiff was failing to work or train her down line, Plaintiff's inaction prejudiced
other qualifying participants, and Sunrider wanted to comply with the law. Sunrider had nothing
to gain by stopping Plaintiffs payments. Even Plaintiff testified that Sunrider would have to pay
out the same percentage amount regardless of whether Plaintiff was paid. Plaintiff started to
testify that Sunrider may benefit because some of its "big people" would get more money but then
retracted the statement. (See page 153-156 of the Deposition of Janet Peterson).
There are no material facts in dispute on this issue, and Defendant is entitled to
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judgment as a matter of law. The Court grants Defendants motion to dismiss the claim of
intentional interference with contractual relations.

Breach of contract against Tei Fu Chen
The Court grants Defendant's motion to summarily dismiss the breach of contract
against Tei Fu Chen.
"As a general rule, stockholders of a corporation are not liable, as such, for any
obligations of the corporation, regardless of how they were incurred." Parker v. Telegift
International. Inc.. 505 P.2d 301, 302 (Utah 1973) (citing 19 Am.Jur.2d, Corporations § 713). In
fact, the president and major stockholders of a corporation cannot be liable for breach of contract
unless they "acted beyond the scope of [their] powers or against the interests of the corporation."

Straiten at 118.
Plaintiff argues that Tei Fu Chen became personally responsible for all obligations of
NaturaLife, including the contract with Plaintiff, because he became the only shareholder.
However, Plaintiff offers no facts or law to base this conclusion on. Just because Tei Fu Chen is
the sole shareholder does not necessarily make him personally liable for the 1976 writing. It is
also important to note that there are no facts indicating that Tei Fu Chen acted beyond his power,
or against the interest of Sunrider (See the "intentional interference with contractual relations"
section above).
There are no facts in dispute on this issue because Plaintiff has offered no evidence
showing that Tei Fu Chen personally assumed liability for the 1976 writing, or that Tei Fu Chen
acted outside the scope of his power. Because there are no material facts in dispute, and
Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court must summarily dismiss the
personal liability claim against Tei Fu Chen.

Pvmitiye damages
The Court grants Defendant's motion to summarily dismiss Plaintiffs claim of punitive
damages.
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Punitive damages may be awarded if there is "clear and convincing evidence that the
acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent
conduct, or that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of the
rights of others." Utah Code 78-18-1. Malice can be impliedfromunjustifiable conduct. Branch
v. Western Petroleum. Inc.. 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982).
Plaintiff claims punitive damages against Tei Fu Chen. However, as noted above, there
is no evidence showing any unjustifiable conduct, malice, or reckless indifference. The undisputed
evidence indicates that Sunrider stopped payments because Plaintiff was not working and because
Sunrider wanted to comply with the law. Because the tort claim of intentional interference
against Tei Fu Chen has been dismissed, the prayer for punitive damages against Tei Fu Chen will
also be summarily dismissed.
Plaintiff also claims punitive damages against Sunrider. Plaintiff argues that Sunrider
violated its contractual duty of good faith and fair dealings. However, punitive damages are not
available for a breach of contract. Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co.. 660 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1983).
Punitive damages are only available if "the breach of contract amounts to an independent tort.
Jorgensen at 232. There is no tort claim against Sunrider. Therefore, the Court must summarily
dismiss the claim of punitive damages against Sunrider.

Breach of contract against Sunrider
The Court grants Defendants motion to summarily dismiss the breach of contract claim
against Sunrider.
Defendant argues that they are entitled to summary judgment because the language of
the 1976 writing is plain, because Plaintiff accepted modifications, and because Plaintiff does not
present sufficient evidence to show damages. However, as noted above in Plaintiffs motion for
partial summary judgment, there are material facts in dispute that must be determined by a factfinder regarding the 1976 writing, modification, and plain language. However, the Court does
grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis of the contract being illegal.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff claims she is entitled to a leadership bonus based solely on
her sponsorship of the Farnsworth organization. Plaintiffs husband purchased the Farnsworth
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organization for $1,500. In return, Plaintiff was to receive approximately $42,000 per year, for an
infinite period of time. Plaintiff admits that she has no obligation to promote or sell a product,
and no obligation to train or supervise down-line distributors. In fact, Plaintiff claims she is
entitled to a leadership bonus without any obligation at all.
The Court holds as a matter of law that receiving bonuses in a multi-marketing business
is illegal when the bonuses are based only upon sponsorship of an organization, rather than upon
promoting a product, selling a product, or training and supervising down-line distributors. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6a-2(4) defines a pyramid scheme as "any sales device or plan under which a
person gives consideration to another person in exchange for compensation or the right to receive
compensation which is derived primarilyfromthe introduction of other persons into the sales
device or plan rather thanfromthe sale of goods, services, or other property." It seems clear that
Plaintiff is receiving compensation derived primarilyfromthe work of other people who were
introduced into the Farnsworth organization. Plaintiff is expecting a bonus without selling any
goods, services, or other property.
The Court realizes that Plaintiff is not recruiting people into the Farnsworth
organization. What troubles the Court is that Sunrider has adopted certain requirements in recent
years to comply with anti-pyramid laws, and Plaintiff claims that these requirements do not apply
to her. The Court disagrees.
The Federal Trade Commission stated that to prevent a pyramid scheme, the safeguards
and requirements of a multi level marketing business must "serve to prevent inventory loading and
encourage retailing. In Re Amway Corp.. 93 F.T.C. 618, 716 (1979). One requirement that the
F.T.C. found to be important was requiring each participant to submit proof of retail sales; this
rule "makes retail selling an essential part of being a distributor. In Re Amway Corp. at 716.
This case presents a unique situation. The anti-pyramid requirements of Sunrider seem
to encourage sales, and prevent focusing onfindingnew recruits. This is exactly what antipyramid laws require. Plaintiff argues that her contract is not illegal because her bonus is based
on sales, not recruits. Then, Plaintiff states that she does not have to comply with the new antipyramid requirements of Sunrider. It seems that Plaintiff is gaining the benefits of Sunrider's antipyramid requirements while refusing to comply with the requirements herself. Although Sunrider

10

may not be operating a pyramid scheme, until Plaintiff complies with Sunrider's anti-pyramid
requirements, Plaintiffs contract is for an illegal purpose. At the very least, Plaintiff must make
some retail sales to qualify to receive leadership bonuses.
The Court cannot enforce an illegal contract, therefore, the Court summarily dismisses
Plaintiffs claims.
IV
DECISION
For the reasons discussed above:
1. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff s Motion to Amend.
2. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Name an Expert Witness.
3. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Affidavits.
4. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion.
5. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
6. The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Compell Discovery.
7. The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss.

Counsel for the Defendant is to prepare an Order consistent with the decision of this Court

Fourth District Court Judge

cc:

Thomas W. Seiler
H. Thomas Stevenson
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Addendum 3
Excerpts of Janet Peterson Deposition
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put from $^,uuu w*^ ~~ T-,
Q.

Okay.

If we wanted to determine today,

for example, how to calculate an override that was
due you, for example, would we have to look at the
Sunrider business guide, then, to determine the
scheduled rate or percentages?
r II

A.

I believe so, yes.

3

Q.

Okay.

9

So the business guide would spell

out what that scheduled rate is?

0 II

A.Yes.

1

Q.

Okay.

2

Exhibit 2, please.

3

please.

Let's look at Paragraph 14 of
Would you read that to yourself,

4

A.

Uh-huh.

.5

Q.

What is your basis for claiming that you

6
L7
L8

are owed by defendants approximately $3,500 per
month?
A.

That's the amount that -- close to.

19 II wasn't ever maybe exactly that amount.
20

It

Sometimes it

was $4,000, maybe a little bit less, of what Company

21 || Direct had been receiving for over 12, 15 years.
22

Well, it was less in the beginning, and it had grown

23

But for the last few months of this several years

24

here, in '95, in the months there, it had been

25

generally in that area.
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Q.

Then the other one was --

A.

Was before.

Q.

was also before?

2

3
4

Okay.

You mentioned

5

that the business guides would change from time to

6

time, but that new incentive programs would be

7

offered; is that correct?
A.
There's been a lot of business guides.

I

8
A~<r* them
think they update
tnem every
evety five or six months or

9
10
11
12
13
14

-mrm
something.

well,
wexj-# *not
*«*- that often.

didn't update them, and then they would, and then
Q.

-

How would you become aware that there had

been an update to the business guides?
A.

Being Janet S. Peterson and going to the

15 II conventions and going to meetings.
16

For a while they

there with me.

They were right

And I bought them, I purchased them.

Q.

Y O U actually bought or purchased them?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

When you received these business guides

17

20

or updated business guides, would you review them in

21

detail?

22
23
24
25

A.

Uh-huh.

Oh, yes.

See what was different

than before.
Q.

Did there come a time when you ceased

••*.«. or
always to review
reviewxng them,
or was
was it
x«- a practice
v
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A.

No.

Always when I received them --

Q.

Do you recall --

A.

-- I would -- I would try to remember the

different things.
Q.

Do you recall when you received your last

Sunrider business guide?
MR. SEILER:

You mean other than through

discovery?
Q.
discovery.
A.

(By Mr. Stevenson)

Other than through

Thank you.
They sent me one -- I got one of

Sharon's, I think, about three years ago.
Q.

That would be sometime in 1994?

A.

Probably.

Q.

Do you recall whether you received one in

A.

I know they sent some.

Uh-huh.

1993?

them to me.
Q.

And I'm not sure.
Okay.

They just sent

They might have.

When new programs or incentive

opportunities would be announced in these business
guides, is it fair to say that the Company Direct
line got the benefit of those new programs?
A.
that.

No.

Because they never received any of

All I received was the purchase volume of what
DEPOMAX REPORTING SERVICES, LLC
* (801) 328-1188 *
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Addendum 4
Excerpts of Tei Fu Chen Deposition

1

calls for a legal conclusion.

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

You testified earlier about changes to

4

the business guide.

Do you recall that?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Has it changed a few times or a lot of

7

times?

8

MR. SEILER:

Objection.

Leading.

9

A.

The business guide changed a few times.

10

Q.

Okay.

And to your knowledge Lloyd

11

Peterson or Janet Peterson never complained about

12

those changes?

13

MR. SEILER:

Objection.

Leading and

14

calls for a legal conclusion and outside the

15

scope of direct.

16

A.

Never.

17

Q.

In answering the questions today do you

18

understand that there's a difference between Tei Fu

19

Chen individually and Sunrider Corporation?

20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. SEILER:

Objection.

Leading and

calls for a legal conclusion.
A.

Tei Fu Chen is myself.

Sunrider is

Sunrider.
Q.

There's a difference?
MR. SEILER:

Objection.

Leading.
91

Addendum 5
Record where Plaintiff/Appellant claims contracts clause/retroactivity issues
were raised in the proceedings below.
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Thomas W. Seiler, #2910
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
80 North 100 East
P.O. Box 1266
Provo,UT 84603-1266
Telephone: (801) 375-1920
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JANET PETERSON,
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS ANI
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

SUNRIDER CORP., dba SUNRIDER
INTERNATIONAL, and TEIFU CHEN,

]
;)

Civil No. 960400174

Defendants.

]1

Judge: Howard H. Maetani

Plaintiff,
vs.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through her counsel of record, Thomas W. Seiler
of the firm of ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC, and submits this Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs
First Cause of Action; Breach of Contract.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

NaturaLife International, Inc. was a Utah Corporation which was incorporated

on May 27, 1976. (See paragraph 3 of Defendants' Answer to Amended Complaint and

The elements of valid, enforceable contract are: 1) proper subject matter; 2) competent
parties; 3) offer; 4) acceptance; and 5) consideration. Neiderhauser Builders and Development
Corp.. v. Campbell. 824 P.2d 1193, 1197-98 (Utah App. 1992). Exhibit A is the outward
manifestation of a legitimate business agreement between two competent parties. Exhibit A
involves a subject matter that was proper for these two parties to be entering into contracts over.
Exhibit A manifests an offer by which Lloyd Peterson offered to purchase from NaturaLife
International, Inc. the NaturaLife Distributors known as Sharon and John Farnsworth, and their
sponsored organizations, so that they may become first level distributors (or directors as the
case may be) to Lloyd Peterson's wife, Mrs. Peterson. Lloyd Peterson's offer was accepted by
Ken Murdock, who was acting on behalf of NaturaLife International, Inc. The consideration
received by NaturaLife International, Inc. from Lloyd Peterson was One Thousand Five
Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00). Exhibit A satisfies each of the elements of a contract, and
therefore should be enforced by the Court.
II.

SUNRIDER IS BOUND BY THE 1976 AGREEMENT SINCE SUNRIDER IS
THE SAME COMPANY AS NATURALIFE INTERNATIONAL, INC.
In 1982 the Defendant Tei Fu Chen acquired NaturaLife International, Inc. by entering

into a Stock Sale Agreement with the sole stockholders of NaturaLife International, Inc.,
Kenneth A. Murdock and George T. Murdock, Jr. Shortly thereafter, NaturaLife International,
Inc.'s name was changed to Sunrider Corporation.
For over 12 years after Tei Fu Chen's 1982 purchase of NaturaLife International, Inc.,
7
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AT
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a4Thomas W. Seiler, #2910
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
80 North 100 East
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, UT 84603-1266
Telephone: (801)375-1920

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JANET PETERSON,

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

SUNRIDER CORP., dba SUNRIDER
INTERNATIONAL, and TEIFU CHEN,
Defendants.

Civil No. 960400174
Judge Howard H. Maetani

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, JANET PETERSON, by and through her counsel of
record Thomas W. Seiler of the firm of ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC, and replies
to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment as follows:

MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH DEFENDANTS ASSERT A GENUINE
ISSUE OF FACT EXITS
8.

It is undisputed that there has been no document signed by Mrs. Peterson, nor

by her deceased husband, to modify Exhibit A. (See paragraph 3 of the Affidavit of Janet
_V

">,

•* r\ i- *

ARGUMENT
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment misstates the basic
points of Mrs. Peterson's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of her Motion
for Summary Judgment. The Argument section of Mrs. Peterson's Memorandum contains
three points, the third of which contains two sub-points.
Enforceable Contract
Mrs. Peterson's first point is the 1976 agreement (hereafter referred to as Exhibit A)
between Lloyd D. Peterson and NaturaLife is a valid, enforceable contract. Mrs. Peterson's
Memorandum establishes that Exhibit A meets each of the elements of a contract, and should
therefore be enforced by the Court. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary
Judgment does not contest, or even mention, Mrs. Peterson's first point.
NaturaLife is Sunrider
Mrs. Peterson's second point is Sunrider is bound by Exhibit A since Sunrider is the
same company as NaturaLife International, Inc. Mrs. Peterson's Memorandum explains that
in 1982 the Defendant Tei Fu Chen acquired NaturaLife International, Inc. by entering into
a Stock Sale Agreement with the sole shareholders of NaturaLife International, Inc., Kenneth
A. Murdock and George T. Murdock, and then shortly thereafter changed the name of the
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Thomas W. Seiler, #2910
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
80 North 100 East
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, UT 84603-1266
Telephone: (801)375-1920
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JANET PETERSON,

]1
I
Plaintiff,
))
vs.
]>
1
SUNRIDER CORP., dba SUNRIDER
]
INTERNATIONAL, and TEIFU CHEN, ]I
Defendants.

]l

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO
DISMISS
Civil No. 960400174
Judge Howard H. Maetani

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, JANET PETERSON, by and through her counsel of
record Thomas W. Seiler of the firm of ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC, and
responds to Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment And
To Dismiss.

1

is derived primarilyfromthe introduction of other persons into the sales device or plan rather
than from the sale of goods, services, or property. The Defendants' argument grossly
misstates the override commission called for by Exhibit A. The override bonus (currently
known as the Leadership Development Bonus) pays a Director a monthly amount which is
a percentage of sales made by all qualified directors that are one, two, or three levels
"downline" from the Director. If the qualified directors that are one, two, or three levels
downlinefromthe Plaintiff did not sale any product, the Plaintiffs override bonus would be
zero. No matter how the Defendants wish to characterize their own Leadership Development
Bonus, the monthly amount due the Plaintiff pursuant to Exhibit A is clearly based on the
sale of Sunrider products.
Defendants accuse Mrs. Peterson of not being able to establish to a degree of
reasonable certainty what the amount of her damages are. It is clear that the percentages and
other payment formulas of Exhibit A are defined by the NaturaLife Policy Guide in effect
at the time Exhibit A was executed. Neither Mrs. Peterson nor the Defendants have a copy
of this NaturaLife Policy Guide, however, the 1978 NaturaLife Policy Guide which is
substantively the same as the NaturaLife Policy Guide that was in effect at the time Exhibit
A was executed. The percentages and payment formulas in this Policy Guide easily establish
to a degree of reasonable certainty what the amount of Mrs. Peterson's damages are. Mrs.
Peterson is owed by the Defendants approximately Three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($3,500.00) per month, commencing with the month of December, 1994, until judgment is
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monthly payment which is the subject of Exhibit A, and to which she was already entitled.
Any allegation to the contrary is not supported by the evidence.
Defendants attempt to use two employment cases to show that the Exhibit A was
somehow modified. Both cases are easily distinguished from the present facts simply
because both cases deal with an employment contract. Gilmore v. Community Action
Program, 775 P.2d 940, 942 (Utah App. 1989), deals with an at-will employment contract.
Because the employment contract was at-will it could be impliedly altered. Id. Employment
manuals, oral agreements, the conduct of parties, practices of a particular trade or industry,
etc, can all be evidence of the alteration of an at-will employment contract. Id. The two
cases cited by Defendants do not lend any strength to their argument because Exhibit A was
not an employment contract, Mrs. Peterson's relationship with the Defendants has never been
as an employee, and there was never an "at-will" relationship between the parties.
The terms of Exhibit A have not been modified. There has never been a meeting of
the minds concerning additional terms or requirements which would modify Exhibit A; there
has never been additional or new consideration received by Mrs. Peterson that would support
a modification of Exhibit A; and there is no writing signed by Mrs. Peterson modifying the
agreement (Exhibit A).
Exhibit A is not void or illegal against public policy or any principles of state and
federal law. The Defendants try to argue that Exhibit A is a plan under which one person
gave consideration to another person in exchange for the right to receive compensation which
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